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UNCERTAINTY AND THE POLITICS 
OF TRANSFORMATION
Ian Scoones and Andy Stirling
Opening up the politics of uncertainty
Why is the idea of uncertainty so important to politics today?1 Why is it especially 
significant for crucial debates about transformations to sustainability? This book 
tackles these big questions by exploring the politics of uncertainty across a range of 
domains and diverse case studies.
The book argues that the embracing of uncertainties  – as constructions of 
knowledge, materiality, experience, embodiment and practice – means challenging 
singular notions of modernity and progress as a hard- wired ‘one- track’ ‘race to 
the future’. Ideas of development and sustainability are very often associated with 
a linear perspective on progress, dominated by narrow views of science and eco-
nomics (Folbre et al. 2018). As a result of this, there is often a reliance on simplistic 
notions of innovation, focusing on those ‘lagging behind’, who must ‘catch up’ or 
‘leapfrog’ to where others have reached. In this way, the framing of innovation and 
progress is reduced to merely how much, how fast, who is ahead and what is the 
risk of proceeding along an assumed pathway. Such debates too often ignore more 
important political questions about which way, what direction and who wins and 
who loses, where issues of uncertainty are central (Stirling 2015). Given diverse 
uncertainties, there is no single assumed endpoint; no one version of modernity and 
progress, and so directions chosen in the pursuit of sustainability and development 
depend on political and social choice (Scoones 2016).
Too often, ideas of transformation and sustainability are framed around par-
ticular, expert- defined ‘solutions’, with uncertainties blanked out. Typically asserted 
with great confidence, burgeoning notions around, for example, ‘smart cities’, 
‘climate- smart agriculture’, ‘clean development’, ‘geo- engineering’, ‘green growth’ 
or ‘zero- carbon economies’ act to suppress appreciation of many forms of uncer-
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specialist views, these core organising ideas for high- level global policy- making 
typically emphasise aspiring control, asserting romantic visions of visionary lead-
ership, heroic expertise, deterministic systems, orderly values, convergent interests, 
compliant citizens and expediently predictable futures.
As a consequence, some highly uncertain issues that should remain open for 
political debate are imagined in circumscribed, biased and one- directional ways. 
The loudest voices and most powerful interests thus come to enjoy a dispropor-
tionate influence in defining what is meant by ‘progress’. The contrast could hardly 
be greater with the potentially open arena for political deliberation constituted by 
the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. Arguably, for the first time in 
history, these establish a globally- shared discourse enabling the exercise of agency 
not only over the possibility of progress but also with regard to its direction. The 
general orientation is clear – towards equality, well- being and ecological integrity; 
but the particularities of what these values might mean in practice – and how best 
to go about realising them – remain deeply uncertain.
Why this matters is that a rich and open- ended array of far wider, deeper and 
more plural kinds of possible societal, cultural and political transformations get 
obscured (Scoones et al. 2015). These many closures of uncertainties in mainstream, 
global discourses around science, technology and social progress typically serve to 
suppress the interests of the most marginalised communities, cultures and environ-
ments. Such failures to embrace uncertainty can presage perhaps the gravest form 
of oppression in the world today: the invisible foreclosing of possible futures. As a 
result, we argue, the opening up of political space to confront radical uncertainty 
can become as crucial to emancipatory politics as many more direct assertions of 
neglected interests.
Uncertainties are inevitable in this negotiation of diverse, possible futures 
concerning different pathways and their consequences (Leach et  al. 2010). 
Uncertainties should not be reduced to risk, framed as a zero- sum threat that is 
in need of taming, controlling and managing, lest innovation is somehow ‘held 
back’ (Kearnes and Wynne 2007). In today’s complex, turbulent, interconnected, 
globalised world, uncertainty must be embraced as perhaps more central than ever. 
We argue that opening up to uncertainty offers opportunity, diversity and a politics 
of hope. This in turn offers a more plural vision of progress, defined according to 
different standpoints, with multiple modernities at play.
The hegemonic ideas of linear progress and modernist development that so 
dominate Western cultures have been exported to the world through waves of colo-
nialism, trade and aid. This ‘globalising modernity’ (Ahuja 2009; Hobden 2002) is 
of course not fixed. Indeed, even in the West, past ideas of progress have been framed 
differently:  for example, around cycles of growth and renewal, rather than linear 
change (Cowen and Shenton 1996). In non- Western cultures, notions of devel-
opment, progress and modernity often have very different connotations, rooted in 
subaltern identities and cultural and religious perspectives (Oxley, Chapter 12). This 
book argues that this globalising version of modernity and progress need not col-
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contingent perspective can be advocated, involving an appreciation of uncertainty 
and its diverse framings.
The book reflects on different cases in different settings, each offering narratives 
about the future, with uncertainty central to the storyline. The chapters focus 
on banking and finance; insurance systems; the regulation of technology; critical 
infrastructures; cities; climate change; disease outbreaks; natural disasters; migra-
tion flows; crime and terrorism and spirituality and religion. All suggest that 
the contemporary moment poses fundamental challenges to the status quo. Old 
assumptions of linear, stable systems, amenable to technical risk management and 
control, do not hold.
This challenges the globalising modernity of (neo)liberal capitalism – with its 
pretence of stable environments and economies, and assertion of particular cultures 
of expertise and structures of appropriation and control. Futures are unknown: even 
when seen from any individual viewpoint, uncertainties are ubiquitous. Diverging 
interests and perspectives introduce further ambiguities. Underlying all this is 
the radical, ever- present potentiality of downright ignorance and surprise. Today, 
financial instability, pandemic disease, climate chaos, recurrent natural disasters and 
threats to liberal, ‘democratic’ orders across the world are refashioning the ways 
policy, politics and governance are thought about. Arguing that uncertainty in all 
its forms is central, this book suggests a new politics of uncertainty: one that offers 
opportunities, but also dangers.
The stakes could hardly be higher. On the one hand, the landscape of pos-
sible futures for globalising forms of modernity suggest trends towards narrow, 
technocratic, fearful, risk- focused intensifications of control. On the other hand, 
subaltern, ‘alternative’ (Kaup 2012; Gaonkar 1999) and ‘minoritarian’ modernities 
(Taraborrelli 2015) – as well as wider emerging ‘non- modernities’ (Ibarra- Colado 
2006) – offer imaginings of new institutions and practices for embracing – even 
celebrating – uncertainty. It is arguably through more equal engagements between 
these diverse cultural, political and organisational forms that space can be found 
for a more plural, mutualistic and hopeful politics of care and conviviality (Stirling 
2019b; Arora 2019; cf. Illich 1973).
From framings to practices of uncertainty
Uncertainties are not merely about the absence of knowledge (Walker et  al. 
2003): they can be very concrete – and formatively diverse – in their manifestations. 
The literatures on uncertainty span many different disciplines, applied to a diver-
sity of domains (Scoones 2019), but a key distinction – highlighted long ago by 
Frank Knight (1921) – is that between risk and uncertainty. Risk is where we know 
what the possible outcomes are and can estimate their probabilities. Uncertainty is 
where we are unsure of the probabilities of particular outcomes. This is important, 
as there is too often a tendency to ‘close down’ towards risk (Stirling 2008), 
pretending to know the probabilities. Yet this is often not realistic in practice, as 
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complex, interacting and non- linear, a narrow engineering risk- based approach is 
inappropriate.
A number of other dimensions of incertitude also arise. These include ambigu-
ities – where there are ongoing disputes about possible outcomes between different 
groups, reflecting contending social and political worlds (Stirling 1999). Here, 
for instance, it may be that debates do not mainly concern how likely different 
outcomes may be, but are about more fundamentally divergent notions of ‘benefit’ 
or ‘harm’, or their distribution across society, or what the alternative options for 
action may be. There is also the predicament of ignorance, where fundamental 
indeterminacies of the world and ‘non- knowledge’ mean we ‘don’t know what we 
don’t know’ (Wynne 1992). And here it is important to remember that surprises can 
of course be positive as well as negative, depending on who is affected.
Under routine conditions, narrow notions of risk can remain useful in the 
engineering of closed systems, or where high- frequency, unchanging processes gen-
erate long- run comparable statistics. Here, there is no need to throw away the baby 
with the bathwater. But even where all parameters are well- known, most conditions 
in the world are uncertain, with specific probabilities and/ or outcomes remaining 
not known or unknowable. And where there is even the possibility of unknown 
parameters, then ignorance is unavoidable. All these cumulative dilemmas have pro-
found consequences, as the chapters in this book explore. The bottom line, in many 
circumstances, is that the assumptions of a risk- based approach can be inappro-
priate, misleading – and even dangerous.
Uncertainties therefore are conditions of knowledge itself – how we understand, 
frame and construct possible futures – and are not just hard- wired into ‘objective’ 
situations. But uncertainties also have other features, beyond these epistemological 
and ontological implications. Across the chapters of this book, four additional 
dimensions are discussed:
• Uncertainties have concrete, material features. They are produced from com-
plex, non- linear unpredictable systems (Driebe and McDaniel 2005). They 
have material origins and effects. For example, the environmental variability 
of rangelands may be a source of productive advantage for pastoralists as they 
move across landscapes harvesting nutrients – living with and from uncertainty 
(Krätli and Schareika 2010). In complex systems, surprises  – sudden ‘black 
swan’ events – may arise that were never expected (Taleb 2007). Taming and 
controlling such systems is impossible, but understanding and responding to 
unpredictable variability is vital (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990), requiring inven-
tion of new forms of science, regulation and management (van Zwanenberg, 
Chapter 4; Roe, Chapter 5).
• Uncertainties are not experienced in the same way by different people. 
Knowledges about the present and perspectives on the future are all 
constructed in particular contexts. Depending on one’s situation, uncertain-
ties may be embraced as an opportunity or encountered as a source of dread, 
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unavoidable. Emotions and feelings matter, as they affect understanding and 
action. Religious and spiritual beliefs about – and enactment of – relationships 
between humans and the world may also impinge (Skrimshire 2014; Oxley, 
Chapter 12), as in Samkhya Hindu philosophy, which offers a plural perspec-
tive on understanding, influenced by consciousness, perception and experi-
ence.2 And, in turn, uncertainties are influenced by histories, cultures and 
identities, as social worlds and historical experiences filter perspectives and 
condition action (Da Col and Humphrey 2012). Thus, marginalised commu-
nities in the global South will experience climate shocks in very different ways 
to privileged groups in the North, as histories of colonialism and dispossession 
influence what is possible and how pasts, presents and futures are viewed (Watts 
and Bohle 1993).
• Perspectives on uncertainties are also embodied, becoming part of who we 
are, as well as how we think and feel (Csordas and Harwod 1994). Sometimes 
this is physically reflected in our bodies. For example, men and women, and 
young and old people, may respond to the uncertainties of climatic or other 
disasters quite differently, as a result of the consequences of events in their 
day- to- day lives (Sword- Daniels et al. 2018). School children may find debates 
about climate change unsettling and anxiety- inducing, especially when ‘facts’ 
are unclear,3 while living with a chronic illness may result in a very different 
outlook to those of medical professionals and even family members, as both 
the condition and its treatment are enacted through the body (Mol and Law 
2004). Drawing on feminist and queer theory, Wendy Harcourt (2013) argues 
that the body plays an important – often hidden and contested – role in the 
ways we encounter the world, and conduct ‘development’. As with ‘tacit 
knowledge’, embodied uncertainties remain entirely undocumented and even 
not consciously apprehended by those most intimately affected, making them 
especially significant when addressing responses to incertitude.
• Finally, our understandings of uncertainty are reflected in practices: how we 
act, and the type of social imaginaries we construct – or which emerge unin-
tentionally  – serve to guide our lives and politics (Arora and Glover 2017; 
Shove et  al. 2012). In response, emerging practices include both controlling 
forms of ‘audit culture’ (Power 2004), as well as more flexible, adaptive forms 
of ‘reliability management’ (Roe 2013; Roe, Chapter  5). During the finan-
cial crisis, it was the practical responses of financial regulators, supervisors and 
traders that helped avoid total collapse. According to Ilene Grabel, this was due 
to features of ‘productive incoherence’ and ‘pragmatic innovation’ in the finan-
cial system (Grabel 2017). A focus on agency, and more distributed possibilities 
for action, directs attention towards relations of power in responding to uncer-
tainty. Michael Thompson and Michael Warburton, for example, explored 
power dynamics around deep uncertainties over deforestation and river man-
agement in the Himalayas – tracking moves within discourse away from ‘what 
the facts are’ towards a focus on what powerful interests ‘would like the facts to 
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proposals was reinforced, while that of less powerful actors – like mountain- 
dwelling subsistence farmers – was denigrated (Thompson and Gyawali 2007; 
Thompson and Warburton 1985).
A diverse appreciation of these five dimensions of uncertainty suggests a challenge 
to the controlling, managerial policy responses that have been the hallmark of techno-
cratic modernity – and, for some, diagnostic of progress. However, as a number of 
this book’s chapters discuss, alternative policy and management approaches have 
been proposed, ranging from adaptive management (Tompkins and Adger 2004) 
to experimentalist approaches (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010) to deliberative governance 
(Dryzek 2012). Central to these are the principles of incremental learning and the 
negotiation of outcomes along complex, plural pathways. Deliberation, negotiation 
and inclusive engagement across diverse knowledges and experiences is essential. As 
the following chapters show through varied examples, this requires an opening up 
to options and knowledges, and across all aspects of incertitude – including uncer-
tainties in the strict sense, as well as ignorance and ambiguities following our earlier 
categorisation. Incertitude must therefore be embraced equally in relation to know-
ledge, materialities, experiences, embodiment and practice.
Yet, as Mary Douglas famously identified, the same apparent ‘objective’ 
conditions of uncertainty can be lived in and worked with in very different ways 
by different people (Douglas 1986). Uncertainties, she argued, are constituted very 
differently – for instance – in hierarchical or egalitarian social orders, or collect-
ivist or individualist institutional cultures (Thompson et al. 1990). Likewise, for the 
influential German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1993), it is contrasting practical 
systems of communication that bring uncertainties to material life. Rather than 
being seen as external ‘states of the world’, uncertainties are therefore better under-
stood as the messy gaps, wrinkles and tangles that serve to make societies aware of – 
and reflexive in relation to – their own conditions of being. And, for the leading 
theorist of the ‘risk society’, Ulrich Beck, it is through uncertainties – more than 
professed knowledge – that contemporary societies most concretely encounter the 
cumulative contradictions of modernity in which they are embedded (Adam et al. 
2000; Beck et al. 1994; Beck 1992).
Like Beck, the contributors to this book see risk and uncertainty as formative 
of contemporary politics (Mythen et al. 2018). Indeterminacy and non- knowledge 
fundamentally shape political and managerial possibilities. As discussed further below, 
the premises of many favoured policy frameworks – from equilibrium economics 
(Raworth 2017) to audit- based management (Power 2004) to economic regula-
tion (Bronk and Jacoby 2016) to security regimes (Amoore 2013; Dillon 2007) to 
insurance provision (Ewald 1991) – become incompatible with embracing the full 
implications of uncertainty. Challenges to such frameworks emerge especially when 
looking at issues and geographies beyond Beck’s original concern with individualised 
risks associated with accelerating industrial modernity in northern Europe (Caplan 
2000). While uncertainties certainly reconfigure politics, they do so in diverse ways. 
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how uncertainties are understood and responded to (Curran 2018). A  focus on 
uncertainty should therefore not divert attention from long- standing perspectives 
on social change, but instead highlight new dynamics (Carrapico et al., Chapter 11)
As a challenge to a control- oriented technocratic order of globalising modernity, 
we argue that a focus on the politics of uncertainty is essential. This confronts the 
linear assumption that a universalised science creates technologies for singular pro-
gress, suggesting instead a more diverse, plural vision, implicating multiple modern-
ities. Indeed, as uncertainties reconfigure politics, we can observe different effects. 
Uncertainty can create anxiety and fear, and open spaces for rent- seeking, profit- 
making and forms of populist authoritarianism (Scoones et al. 2018), while at the 
same time it can offer hope – and spaces for experimentation and learning that 
can lead to an emancipatory politics for the future (Solnit 2016). As the chapters 
discuss  – across a diversity of domains  – which directions are taken, and how 
institutions of science, law and the state respond, are crucial issues for our times 
(Nowotny 2015).
Topologies of uncertainty
Interweaving through these wider currents are the more specific dimensions of 
uncertainty explored in the chapters of this book. Just as quantification of any kind is 
always underlain by qualitative dimensions, so all the different arcane geometries of 
‘risk’ and ‘probability’ are always shaped by the topologies of uncertainty on which 
they are built. So, the structures of possibility underpinning commerce, banking and 
finance are potentially formative of entire wider economies, and deeply influenced 
by the narratives of economics and the forms of modelling of uncertainty that are 
deployed (Walter and Wansleben, Chapter 2). Beyond the particular actuarial expe-
diencies, it is the imagined relationships between presents and futures that make 
insurance so generative of everyday life, and that explain why regarding rigid forms 
of insurance as routes to social protection becomes problematic under conditions 
of uncertainty and ignorance (Johnson, Chapter 3; Taylor 2019).
Infrastructures and regulatory orders assert their own materialisations of polit-
ical imaginations around technology regulation (van Zwanenberg, Chapter 4), the 
management of critical infrastructures (Roe, Chapter 5) and city planning (Kaker 
et al., Chapter 6). These chapters highlight how the practices of scientists, regulators 
and civil society actors can help open up indeterminacies in everything from gen-
etically modified crop technologies to ‘smart’ cars; they emphasise the importance 
of everyday practice and network- building in generating reliability in complex 
critical infrastructures, such as energy systems; and they explore how more effective 
responses to diverse uncertainties can be nurtured through creating ‘experimental 
spaces’ for innovation in urban governance (Evans et al. 2016).
Deepening global vulnerabilities around climate (Mehta and Srivastava, 
Chapter  7), disease (MacGregor et  al., Chapter  8) and ‘natural disasters’ (Pelling 
et al., Chapter 9) create major political challenges for addressing uncertainties. Too 
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in approaches to early warning, emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction. 
Yet, as these chapters show, locating understandings in a more complex appreciation 
of class, gender, ethnicity and age is essential if those directly affected by outbreaks, 
emergencies and disasters are to be involved.
The politics of uncertainty in debates over migration (Thorsen, Chapter 10), 
crime and terrorism (Carrapico et  al., Chapter 11) also reflect highly politicised 
institutional constructions of risk, danger and threat. These may obscure more posi-
tive approaches by ignoring alternative framings centred on hope and possibility 
(Kleist and Thorsen 2016). The knee- jerk, authoritarian response is to control, 
instil fear, construct borders and subject people to intrusive surveillance. A more 
encompassing view, on the other hand, would suggest alternatives; for example, 
focusing on the agency, networks and capacities of migrants themselves in facing 
uncertainties. How then are the contested meanings and implications of uncer-
tainty negotiated? Underlying cultural, religious and spiritual framings may be 
underestimated in our rush to assert technocratic orders, as discussed in our final 
chapter (Oxley, Chapter 12). Religious beliefs involve competing views on destiny, 
renewal and apocalypse, for instance, and so must continuously grapple with issues 
of uncertainty as framing human existence, suggesting the need for a wider, more 
encompassing view.
From calculative control to creative care
A classic insight that arises from non- linear systems understandings – that minor 
changes can make a big difference – means that simple notions of prediction and 
control are a myth. Yet even with this acknowledgement widely accepted (if only 
rhetorically), indeterminacies are too often represented in a controlling, calculative 
and aggregative register. How often, for example, does discussion of ‘tipping points’ 
move from humility in the face of their possibility to hubris in regard to their pre-
cise prediction, or misplaced confidence that such complex systems can be subject 
to ‘risk management’? (Lenton et al. 2019). As a result, the crucial point about the 
uncontrollability of uncertainty may paradoxically be most lost when it is appar-
ently most acknowledged.
A number of the book’s chapters reflect on a wide range of models. These include 
the economic forecasting models used by banks (Wansleben 2014); the actuarial 
and parametric models central to the (re)insurance industry (Johnson 2013); the 
infectious disease models that predict patterns of spread and impact and the many 
models that aim to predict the impacts of natural hazards – from floods to volcanoes 
to earthquakes (Hough 2002). Here as elsewhere, modelling struggles to make sense 
of uncertain, complex systems, often aiming to predict future patterns. Yet again, 
these calculative mathematical devices and aggregative practices too often involve 
attempted reductions of uncertainties to risk (Hastrup and Skrydstrup 2013).
In all these areas, non- linear interactions and disequilibrium dynamics at the 
heart of complex systems make the necessary simplifications and assumptions of 
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none misleads. It may help raise awareness about a particular potential disaster 
and raise funds for agencies aiming to respond. But this itself may divert attention 
from diverse lived- with, grounded circumstances, offering instead a headline figure 
projecting one impending crisis. And these imperatives may also blinker key players 
against surprise, entrenching ideas that a risk- managed status quo will result in sta-
bility. Reflecting on the financial crash of 2008, Andy Haldane, chief economist at 
the Bank of England, observed:
Securitisation increased the dimensionality, and thus complexity, of the 
financial network. Nodes grew in size and interconnections between them 
multiplied. The financial cat’s- cradle became dense and opaque. As a result, 
the precise source and location of underlying claims became anyone’s guess 
(2009: 7).
The resulting crisis, Haldane (2010: 12) argues, was rooted in ‘an exaggerated sense 
of knowledge and control’.
Of course, all models come with lists of provisos, caveats and qualifications, but, 
even with accuracy thus qualified, a key role persists in governing action. Here, the 
silences of models are as important as their proclamations. So in the end models 
are – albeit often quite elaborate – vehicles for telling stories. They equally embody 
and construct narratives about both present- futures and future- presents, often 
dressed up with arcane equations and mathematical formulations (Beckert and 
Bronk 2018). The narratives they relate are socially constructed, becoming accepted 
through often quite homogenous, uncritical networks of actors (Bronk 2019). 
Members of such networks all have a vested interest in maintaining an impression 
of control and giving a sense that collectively they have a capacity to manage com-
plexity and define the future.
While such stories often unravel in the face of real- world events, the incumbent 
power of professions and their institutions – not surprisingly – soon reinstate the 
status quo. The last crisis is deemed an outlier, models are improved and the fragile 
performance of control continues in the face of uncertainty. Studies of financiers 
during and following the 2008 crash are instructive. The psychological impera-
tive to construct ‘conviction narratives’ and deny uncertainty was evident, as the 
incentives for promoting positive imaginaries around fictional expectations were 
huge (Tuckett 2018). In the same way, misplaced concreteness in models at the 
centre of decision- making can be seen as a defensive mechanism used to displace 
anxieties around uncertain outcomes (Fenton- O’Creavy 2019).
Exercising huge power in policy processes, this process of storytelling through 
models is about presenting clear storylines, but also often involves moves to con-
ceal and divert attention. Embedded assumptions typically hide normative, ethical 
and political positions, but because of the story’s form, these appear only obliquely, 
or are hidden in the footnotes, acknowledgements, sensitivity analyses, funding 
sources and additional materials. Since models afford less audience interaction than 
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This raises questions about who grants authority to the narrative and how this is 
mediated; for instance with the media filtering out the headline story and ignoring 
the detail (Beckert and Bronk 2018).
This combination of rhetorical and market power helps entrench institutional 
and policy monocultures that in their turn further reinforce the authority given to 
such partial knowledge (Bronk and Jacoby 2016). Banks, risk management author-
ities, insurance firms, civil contingency agencies, humanitarian organisations and 
others require such knowledge that excludes significant dimensions of uncer-
tainty in order to function (Walter and Wansleben, Chapter 2; Johnson, Chapter 3; 
MacGregor et  al., Chapter  8). They have the power to control narratives, sta-
bilise expectations and define the future on their terms. These are classic hege-
monic constellations that offer an illusion of control. In economics and finance, 
for example, commitments to the gold standard, the sanctity of the money supply 
and the power of equilibrium economics have, at different times, been core to 
belief systems, each with wide institutional and political commitments. Yet in each 
case, supported by powerful models with fragile assumptions, they have all been 
challenged and overturned (Mazzucato 2018).
In order to understand how models – and associated narratives – act to construct 
and colonise futures in ways that link to a wider political economy of incumbent 
power, we must understand their social and political lives (Appadurai 1988). This, in 
particular, means understanding the actors involved and their links across networks 
(Barthe et  al. 2009). Insights from science and technology studies show processes 
through which particular equations and parameters become core to a model, which in 
turn becomes central to policy thinking. Whether these concern the epidemiologies 
of disease control (Leach and Scoones 2013) or constructions of financial derivatives 
(MacKenzie and Spears 2014), the models are not just strings of equations, but are 
linked to real people, places and problems – and so have social and political origins 
and consequences. The ways in which complex economies, climate dynamics or dis-
ease ecologies are modelled involves deliberate approaches to creating a calculative 
order (Çalışkan and Callon 2009), part of a performative process of model construc-
tion. That models are always tentative and provisional should not be a surprise, but 
their political role must be interrogated (Morgan 2012). As several chapters in the 
book show, the hegemonic acceptance of particular models – whether by bankers, 
auditors, actuaries, corporate risk managers or early warning administrators – remains 
a political act, even if it is inadvertent and normalised in everyday practice.
Whether in relation to economic or financial collapse, pandemic outbreaks, 
regulatory responsibilities, earthquake vulnerabilities or climate catastrophe, the 
dilemmas are highly pressing. How then to go beyond dominant forms of pol-
itical and market closure – and the ubiquitous analytical monocultures that these 
engender? This is particularly difficult because prevailing cultures and practices 
around ever- more- powerful modelling can – through the brittle hubris of their 
technical disciplines, performative scope and normative sincerity – actually become 
a core part of the problem, as deadlines are specified, limits and boundaries defined 
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The value of modelling must therefore be recognised as conditional and partial – 
thus requiring attention to dialogue, deliberation and the practical politics both 
of conception and application (Christley et al. 2013). Models are about different 
ways of making sense, not definitive ways of asserting precise predictions. Beyond 
the narrow models that often define a predictive risk paradigm, there are of course 
alternative cultures of modelling (Lahsen 2005). Here plurality is central – different 
models tell contrasting stories, and the key for policy is the conversation between 
them. Models may be derived from different sources of knowledge – from high- end 
science to more grounded, participatory insights – and so the story must be told as 
part of an interactive translation between idioms and explanations.
For example, in infectious disease management, analysts may confront uncer-
tainties emerging from process models that examine the underlying population 
dynamics, from pattern models that explore the spatial dimensions of disease and 
from participatory models rooted in local people’s perspectives, as differentiated 
by class, age and gender. Only by developing a narrative across all three can a 
more integrated and effective perspective on disease control emerge (Scoones et al. 
2017). Similarly, understandings of uncertainties around climate change that are 
obtained ‘from above’ – from global circulation models, for  example – and ‘from 
below’ – such as from those living in flood- prone cities – can encourage a conver-
sation about how to address climate change collectively (Mehta et al. 2019). The 
co- production of knowledge, power and social order (Jasanoff 2004) generates a 
politics of engagement that is more suited to conditions of uncertainty (Mehta 
and Srivastava, Chapter 7). An open epistemology is therefore called for, one that 
follows the well- established traditions of feminist methodology, where plural, par-
tial, situated knowledges are central to emergent understandings and responses 
(Haraway 1988; Harding 1987).
In embracing uncertainty in modelling practice, the emphasis must therefore 
shift towards active advocacy of qualities of doubt (rather than certainty), scepticism 
(rather than credulity) and dissent (rather than conformity) – and so towards cre-
ative care rather than calculative control. With indeterminacy thus embraced and 
irreducible plurality accepted, non- control and ignorance emerge as positive values 
in any attempt to create narratives for policy under conditions of uncertainty.
Modernities in the mirror
Amid all this complexity, a rather straightforward lesson repeatedly asserts 
itself: uncertainty (of whatever kind) is by definition not a condition that is simply 
‘out there’ in the world; uncertainty is a property of relations between what is 
known and who is doing the knowing. Uncertainty therefore has at least as much 
to do with subjective dynamics within processes of knowledge production as the 
supposedly objective phenomena that are being represented. Whichever view is 
taken of knowledge itself (from ‘objective’ to ‘subjective’), after all, all uncertain-
ties are always at least to some degree ‘subjective’ (Kahneman and Tversky 1981). 
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subjects of knowledge, and are less reflective of the external objects on which these 
focus. In short, with uncertainty more a mode of action than a static condition, the 
phenomenon of being uncertain is perhaps better understood as a relational verb 
than as a categorical noun (Stirling 2019a).
Why this lesson is inconvenient is that it counters the expedient idea that uncer-
tainties are readily subject to control. And  – in the everyday life of institutions 
around the world – it is claims to be ‘in control’ of uncertainty that are (as we 
have discussed) crucial practical political resources for arguments and commitments 
around modernity and progress (Stirling 2019b). Therefore, for agencies involved in 
world trade regimes, intergovernmental science assessments, global environmental 
instruments, (inter)national regulatory standards and corporate risk assessments, for 
instance, it is claims to be able to control uncertainty that underpin the securing of 
authority, justification, legitimacy, trust and wider public acceptance (Pielke 2019; 
Anderson and Jewell 2019). If it were admitted that key uncertainties are not under 
control, then the roles, identities – as well as legitimacy and authority – of these 
agencies would be seriously eroded, and their claimed functions of planning, pre-
diction, management and regulation undermined.
Across different kinds of governance structure, then, efforts frequently centre 
on pretending that uncertainty has been subdued by a series of control measures 
(Katzenstein and Seybert 2108). This is done in a number of ways. First, as already 
discussed, many messy, complex, open- ended dimensions of uncertainty are forced 
into a restrictive straight- jacket of ‘risk’. Here, what are held to count as the relevant 
parameters are simply assumed to take a very few conveniently measurable forms. 
Values obtained on this basis for ‘probabilities’ and ‘magnitudes’ are presumed – as a 
matter of faith – to take the form of single precise, scalar numbers. And the results 
of all these highly subjectively situated procedures (often involving various forms 
of modelling) are then asserted as if they were precisely fixed ‘out there’ in a sup-
posedly objective world. None of these rhetorics of control are grounded in the 
more complex and intractable realities of uncertainty, but the resulting performance 
remains immune to the profound mismatch, because the pretence is so essential to 
organisational and political functioning.
Hinging on this fallacy of control there emerges a further significant – but often 
neglected – implication. Reflecting similar confusions between what is ‘objective’ 
and what is ‘subjective’ in the compressions of uncertainty into risk, this concerns 
modernity itself. For, despite the many flows of creolising diversity discussed earlier, 
hegemonic forms of modernity also centrally revolve around control. This has been 
expressed, for example, in processes of individualisation, industrialisation, capitalisa-
tion, commoditisation, rationalisation and bureaucratisation, as well as the consoli-
dation of the nation state, the assertive hegemony around science and notions of 
‘democracy’ and – of course – the emergence of European colonialism. All involve 
their own varieties of fictions, fallacies or fantasies of control (Stirling 2019c).
What is common across the institutions, practices and cultures of globalising 
modernity, then, is the compulsion to offer performances of control, even if these 
are a pretence. In this light, the pervasive experience of uncertainty is not so much 
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across so many areas are reflections of particular versions of modernity. In this sense, 
the predicaments of uncertainty are modernities in the mirror.
Yet the modernist institutions of control are patently failing. The perform-
ance of ‘seeing like a state’ (Scott 1998) or ‘enclave capital’ (Ferguson 2005) is no 
longer convincing. Challenges to mainstream conceptions of development – and 
its scientific, bureaucratic and institutional underpinnings – are coming from all 
directions. The climate crisis, turbulence in global financial institutions, infectious 
diseases that spread rapidly across continents and migration between nations on a 
massive scale – to name but a few – all challenge the conventional order. The post- 
World War II settlement that was overseen by the United Nations and the Bretton 
Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), and 
later the World Trade Organisation, all underpinned by Western science and tech-
nology, is not up to contemporary, intersecting challenges. Visions of modernity 
and constructions of ‘development’, established over the last 75 years in the West 
in particular, are unravelling (Hilgartner et  al. 2015). Once- accepted parameters 
of progress – for example, permanent economic growth, an environment without 
limits, the provision of a welfare state, even parliamentary democracy – are being 
challenged (Kallis 2019; Mouffe 2018). These are of course not new observations, 
but it is much less recognised that the deficits of contemporary governance are 
intimately linked to the cumulative failings on the part of globalising modernities 
to face up to uncertainty in a complex, turbulent world.
In the face of such challenges, new versions of modernity are in the making. The 
implications of uncertainty are so profound that they challenge existing hegemonic 
frameworks and institutions, and drive imaginations of a post- capitalist, sustainable 
future, rooted in a new politics (Mason 2016; Gibson- Graham 2008). Some may 
reach out to utopian futures (Levitas 2013) in order to prefigure alternatives and 
define a new ‘common sense’, aimed at overturning existing hegemonic forces 
(Mason 2019). Others may focus on the many experiments in alternative econ-
omies, technology prototyping, architecture and design, based on the principles of 
the commons, community, conviviality and collectivity. While these rarely expli-
citly emphasise responses to conditions of uncertainty, they certainly reject the 
dominant modes of control, encouraging creative responses that are rooted in place 
(Braybrooke and Smith 2018). In turn, through attempting to decolonise the future, 
a prefigurative politics is imagined (Feola 2019), which defines how a world that 
embraced uncertainty might look. In The Way of Ignorance, the novelist, poet and 
farmer Wendell Berry (2008: ix– x) makes the case for such an approach:
Because ignorance is … a part of our creaturely definition, we need an appro-
priate way: a way of ignorance, which is the way of neighborly love, kindness, 
caution, care, appropriate scale, thrift, good work, right livelihood … The way 
of ignorance, therefore, is to be careful, to know the limits and the efficacy 
of our knowledge. It is to be humble and to work on an appropriate scale.
As Brian Wynne elaborates,4 to embrace ignorance is to celebrate the pervasive 
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ways of knowing any object, no matter how familiar. Surprise is thus not a threat to 
identity, status or authority, but a source of enriching, unrealised epistemic plural-
ities. But, rather than nurturing Berry’s positive ‘way of neighborly love’, reactions 
can instead emphasise existential threats to a supposed ‘natural other’, resulting in 
sometimes brutal reinforcements of control. The challenge then lies in reframing 
ignorance as an invitation to plural hopes, and respectful recognition of difference, 
rather than singular fears.
However, as several chapters in the book point out, this more positive vision of 
the potential of alternative modernities is not without its own challenges. While 
abandoning the pretence of control can open up space for progressive alternatives, 
this too can itself also create opportunities for more regressive forces to exploit spaces 
of uncertainty. Without deliberate efforts at fundamental reinvention of economy, 
society and politics – in diverse forms, in different contexts – older, regressive tropes 
and practices can re- emerge. Insecurities and vulnerabilities generated by uncer-
tainties can create a politics of fear and blame (Linke and Smith 2009). Epistemic 
diversity and a lack of understanding between different races and ethnic groups 
result in xenophobic exclusions of migrants and fortress mentalities. This entrenches 
borders, with further erosions of appreciations for diversity resulting in racist attacks 
and discrimination based on sexualities and identities. Struggles between caring 
hopes and controlling fears are turbulent.
For across the world today, these political spaces are being encroached on by 
many forms of populist, nationalist discourse, steeped in authoritarianism and vio-
lence – promising reassertions of control in the face of uncertainty (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser 2018; Scoones et  al. 2018).5 The perceived chaos and lack of control 
that results from the collapse of the mainstream institutions of modernity are there-
fore breeding grounds for hate and violence and impositions of authoritarian rule. 
They also open up opportunities for exploitation and profit, in an unregulated, 
chaos- infused capitalism. Those with privileged positions in structures of appro-
priation – from national political- military elites to hedge fund managers to land 
speculators  – can make money and gain power from capitalising on expanding 
conditions of uncertainty.
Across the chapters in this book, we explore how to foster the possibilities of 
alternative, emancipatory futures, while recognising the perils of embracing uncer-
tainty. We argue that, in a complex, interconnected world, uncertainties are central 
to our common futures – and to normative ideas of sustainability and develop-
ment. Through looking in the mirror, we have learned that a globalising, modernist 
framing of progress will not work, and has failed fundamentally. But how to usher 
in a more caring, collective, convivial, emancipatory alternative, without opening 
up to the clear, and sometimes present, dangers?
Uncertainty, vulnerability and precarity
This challenge is especially acute in contexts where people are living in highly vul-




Uncertainty, politics and transformation 15
time- dependent life/ body challenges, not the long- term future. Vernacular, 
grounded, everyday uncertainties reflect class, race, age, gender and other 
dimensions of difference. Therefore, addressing uncertainty means confronting 
inequality, vulnerability, precarity and the deeply embedded inheritances of history 
head- on. Uncertainty is never just a technical issue.
As has long been known, there is no such thing as a ‘natural’ hazard: hazards, 
and the vulnerabilities arising, are always co- constituted with social, ecological, 
political and economic contexts (Watts 2015; Blaikie et  al. 1994). Uncertainties 
therefore generate place- based political ecologies and economies of vulnerability, 
raising questions of causal explanation and ethical responsibility (Ribot 2014). For 
example, the experience of flooding in the outer suburbs of New York City is 
unavoidably entwined with issues of poverty, housing quality and racial disloca-
tion (Maantay and Maroko 2009). How people approach flood insurance is there-
fore refracted through these positionalities (Elliot 2018). In the same way, climate 
change in coastal Bangladesh is very real for those experiencing repeated flooding, 
yet externally- driven ‘adaptation’ responses may facilitate dispossession through the 
creation of alternative, ‘modern’ livelihoods (Paprocki 2018). The cyclone that struck 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 2019 was one of the most severe on record, but, 
again, its consequences have to be read politically, just as with Hurricane Katrina, 
which devastated parts of New Orleans in 2005 (Braun and McCarthy 2005).
Vernacular understandings of those confronting uncertainties and disasters must 
be the starting point for any analysis (Wynne 1996). For example, as in Mozambique 
in 2019, the complex effects of a flood – on housing, farming, health, mobility – are 
often poorly understood by humanitarian agencies and those providing protec-
tion (Hope 2019). The logics of local practice are complex, informed by diverse 
framings of what the risk is and to whom. Thus, in the context of the response 
to Ebola in West Africa, it was the local people who turned around the epidemic, 
linked to their located understanding of who was infected and how the disease 
spread. Interventions in burial ceremonies and movements to markets and between 
villages were key (Richards 2016). In the case of New York City, residents of the 
poor, outer suburbs  – mostly non- white  – reflected not on a technical hazard, 
nor on uncertainty per se, but on ‘trouble’:  a summing up of the challenges of 
livelihoods linked to debt, poor housing, homelessness, disenfranchisement and lack 
of faith in the state (Elliot 2018).
Such practical logics and vernacular understandings emerge from place- based 
experience, as well as histories. People in rural Mozambique, just as suburban 
New York City, know they are largely on their own. The measures designed to 
help are palliative and limited. People must therefore respond in ways that are 
rooted in networked solidarities that get them through a crisis. This draws on deep 
associations – of religious, racial and ethnic connection – often wrapped up with 
longer histories and memories. Identity and place are thus inevitably entwined 
with how responses to uncertainty emerge. For those marginalised in relation to 
race, for example, people may draw on deep memories of slavery and colonialism 
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ancestors had suffered other uncertainties that resonate with today’s experiences 
(McKittrick 2011). The ‘slow violence’ of sustained exploitation and recurrent 
uncertainty (Nixon 2011) contrasts dramatically with a liberal, ‘white’ vision of 
open- ended, imagined futures – a luxury created in many respects on the back of 
sustained exploitation (Anderson et al. 2019; Anderson 2012). In thinking about 
the constructions of and responses to uncertainty, particularly in contexts with long 
histories of marginalisation and structural inequality, the framing of ethical choice, 
issues of temporality and what constitutes the future for whom become critical 
considerations.
Yet the contemporary institutional paraphernalia of disaster intervention strat-
egies around emergency response, preparedness planning, early warning, civil con-
tingency, disaster risk reduction and so on, frequently fails to take such contexts into 
account (MacGregor et al., Chapter 8). The risk is tangible, the response is specific 
and a veritable industry is mobilised around it. The burgeoning institutionalisation 
of the disaster industry – from the global Sendai framework to local municipal con-
tingency plans – act too often to construct narrow, manageable, technical responses 
(Cannon and Müller- Mahn 2010; Pelling et al., Chapter 9). Global infectious dis-
ease responses, for example, are often medicalised (focusing on a single pathogen, 
linked to a drugs and vaccine response) and frequently securitised (urging control 
at source, militarised emergency planning and draconian intervention if needed) 
(Lakoff 2017; Elbe 2010; MacGregor et al., Chapter 8).
The narratives of ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’ encourage urgency and help mobilise 
funds, but may act to divert attention from the local and particular, where responses 
in different forms are being constructed. Emergencies are declared in order that 
normal democratic rules do not apply, bureaucratic hurdles are jumped and a 
securitised, post- political technocratic order is imposed (Calhoun 2010). However, 
the language of crisis can blind those involved to the uncertainties at play, no matter 
what the urgency. In the complex of responses around disasters and emergen-
cies – from climate change (Mehta and Srivastava, Chapter 7) to disease outbreaks 
(MacGregor et al., Chapter 8) to terrorism (Carrapico et al., Chapter 11) – a set of 
technologies and practices act to govern the future.
This style of ‘biopolitical’ governmentality (Lentzos and Rose 2009) creates 
forms of control, exerted through a complex of discourse and practice. This in turn 
results in subjectification of key actors as victims and the reification of particular 
forms of technical expertise, sometimes resulting in securitised responses. Thus, the 
uncertainties around, say, biodiversity loss and extinction rates have been fuelling 
forms of ‘militarised conservation’ in response to ‘emergency’ conditions (Duffy 
et al. 2019). In this and other cases, intersecting modalities of emergency response 
in turn generate new uncertainties and inequalities, sometimes perpetuating the 
problem (Samimian- Darash and Rabinow 2015). As the chapters in this book show, 
such styles of expert- led, technocratic, securitised response are problematic, both 
practically and politically.
Take infectious disease control responses. From Ebola to avian influenza to 
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global health bureaucracies. Yet too often, risk is again instrumentalised, resulting in 
medicalised, securitised responses. This cannot address more complex disease ecologies, 
or how ill- health is generated through multiple, interacting factors, such as malnu-
trition, immunodeficiency and marginalisation. Ill- health often emerges from struc-
tural inequalities (Farmer 1996), and is lived with, and experienced, by those exposed, 
generating often quite individualised emotions and bodily responses (Nguyen and 
Peschard 2003). In such cases, knowledge about outcomes is complex and indeter-
minate, and so not amenable to a conventional risk response. Instead, responses must be 
assembled locally by multiple actors (more than singular authorities), be constituted in 
social relations (more than categories of institutions), be rooted in context (more than 
universal standards) and deploy practical knowledges from diverse sources (more than 
elite disciplinary expertise). Effective responses to uncertainties around ill- health are 
therefore emergent, based on contestation and deliberation, and grounded in everyday 
practical and emotional experience (MacGregor et al. Chapter 8).
However, we must ask: can those living with ill- health or confronting climate 
change or disasters devote the time and energy to assemble responses in the face of 
such bewildering, overwhelming uncertainty? Being income- and time- poor, the 
marginalised are often the last to engage with inclusive, deliberative processes, even 
if these are offered. Living in conditions of precarity means people do not have 
the luxury of responding to unknown futures: daily survival is the focus, and stress, 
anxiety and trauma are common. In such circumstances, time becomes compressed, 
and it is impossible to contemplate long- term future horizons. It is perhaps such 
people who most require state protections that are informed by expert judgement. 
Does passing on the responsibility for managing uncertainties to those experien-
cing already precarious lives only add to their burden? Who can they trust and rely 
on to care for their welfare?
Forms of local collective action and mutualism through traditional kin networks, 
religious congregations, charities, friendly societies or other collectivities have long 
provided this function, combined with various forms of coping, making- do and 
improvised resourcefulness.6 Modern welfare states took this over but have been ravaged 
by the hollowing out of state functions through neoliberal policies. Meanwhile, social 
and disaster insurance has recently become a preferred solution, addressing welfare at 
a distance through the market. Yet none of these models – whether through volun-
tary association, the state or the market – can easily address the radical uncertainties 
that people face. Instead, a consideration of uncertainty under conditions of precarity 
requires a radical rethink of notions of welfare and livelihood support.
As several chapters in this book argue, this suggests the need for a more sensi-
tive, co- produced response that does not impose a technocratic, standardised plan, 
but at the same time does not load responsibilities wholly onto local people to 
work out on their own. For example, can insurance approaches be refashioned 
such that local forms of moral economy and mutual help become supported, rather 
than side- lined by technocratic, top- down approaches (Johnson, Chapter 3)? Such 
approaches must encourage ‘communities of fate’  – those confronting the same 
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(Marske 1991) – to come together around shared solidarities and mobilise around 
demanding new terms, and different approaches to insurance provision and welfare 
support (Elliot 2018).
Alongside welfare and livelihood support, a focus on uncertainty also requires 
us to re- imagine the institutions surrounding preparedness planning, contingency 
measures and early warning systems. As discussed above, expert- led, technocratic 
impositions premised on risk do not work. But what might? Can an inclusive early 
warning system for, say, drought or disease outbreaks be imagined, where burdens 
are shared, multiple knowledges brought together, networks of trust built and nego-
tiation around interpretations facilitated? Could this be based around an improvised, 
experimental approach across sites, but linked to and informed by climate data, 
disease monitoring or disaster/ hazard mapping? As Chapters 7 and 8 show, know-
ledge intermediaries and brokers become crucial for such initiatives, facilitating 
deliberation and negotiation, and offsetting rumour, speculation and concealment, 
which often result in expert- led systems being rejected. Who such intermediaries 
are would depend on the context, but trust across social differences and hierarchies 
is essential. Such an approach would move beyond assignations of risk and cultures 
of blame to a common, shared goal of navigating uncertainty together.
In sum, a new politics of uncertainty must challenge the biopolitical framings and 
governmentalities of conventional technocratic approaches that define populations 
or geographic areas as ‘at risk’. Instead, the intersections of uncertainty, vulnerability, 
precarity and marginalisation must be taken seriously, alongside a commitment 
to ‘cognitive justice’ (Visvanathan 2005). This suggests a very different type of 
approach, centred on shared understandings, negotiation of outcomes and collective 
solidarity and mobilisation. It must be rooted in what we have earlier identified as 
a politics of care and conviviality, rejecting a simple reliance on state protection, 
standardised welfare and market- based insurance.
Asking questions about whose crisis, catastrophe or emergency it is, and how 
it is experienced, is not a denial of the importance of the event, or the roles for 
expertise in defining key aspects. Instead, it is a recognition that climate change, 
disease, earthquakes  – or other uncertain events  – will look different from the 
standpoint of those living in conditions of precarity and vulnerability. This means 
recasting responses, moving away from ones that are forged through externally- 
imposed, expert- led governmentality towards forms of ‘response- ability’ (Haraway 
1997), with located capabilities and horizontal accountabilities at the core. As we 
discuss further in the next section, this has profound implications, including a need 
to reject all kinds of authoritarian control – technocratic as much as autocratic – in 
order to foster opportunities for more caring forms of political relations and action 
under conditions of uncertainty.
Uncertainty and the politics of responsibility
Uncertainties create cultures of blame, but also a politics of responsibility and 
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mitigation? Where does epistemic, cognitive justice lie? The rise of a marketised 
form of risk governmentality, typified by the promotion of various forms of insur-
ance (Johnson, Chapter 3), has generated a particular style of politics, where risks 
are redistributed through market mechanisms. These approaches often overshadow 
other approaches to the redistribution of risk and the allocation of responsibility.
In particular, the less obvious forms of social solidarity and mutualism, based on 
collective forms of protection against risk and uncertainty, are too often ignored. 
But, if uncertainties are indeterminate and non- knowledge is central, then ways 
of life are simply not insurable in any conventional sense, and alternative, ‘moral 
economy’ responses are required. As a result, very different types of governance must 
emerge, associated with new roles for citizens confronting uncertainty. To respond 
to complex uncertainties, citizens cannot just be customers of standardised insur-
ance products, nor passive citizens of supposedly benevolent technocratic states – 
they must take on new roles, as part of collectivities that are based on the principle 
of solidarity, where care and collaboration are central (Bollier and Helfrich 2014; 
Gibson- Graham 2008).
If openness is encouraged, challenges will necessarily arise around ‘regulatory 
arbitrage’ – deciding which version counts in commitments to negotiated outcomes. 
We must ask: who is the bearer of risk and uncertainty of last resort, and what is 
the role of the state in the context of a less hierarchical, more citizen- led approach 
to governance? Responsibilities must be shared, fostering horizontal and vertical 
accountabilities as embedded politically vibrant relationships, not as part of simple 
auditable accounting (Gaventa 2002). And such relationships need to be sustained 
over time, since the addressing of one source of uncertainty inevitably raises new ones. 
Processes must be continuous and recursive, based on experimentation, learning, 
evaluation and adaptation (Guijt 2019). This requires new styles of expertise, legal 
mediation and state regulation that are more flexible and open, requiring a radical 
reconfiguration of professional and institutional approaches in planning and regula-
tion (van Zwanenberg, Chapter 4; Kaker et al., Chapter 6).
The sort of deliberative, adaptive, experimental forms of governance that 
accepting uncertainty demands already happen, of course – but often without rec-
ognition. So, for example, in relation to the governance of energy infrastructure in 
Europe, experiments have taken place around the transport and supply of electri-
city, allowed for by the European Union’s decentralised policy regime, and guided 
by the principle of subsidiarity (Rangoni 2019). Learning among companies and 
regulators has taken place, and substantial shifts have occurred in regimes over time, 
without directed intervention. Similarly, in complex, dispersed supply chains for 
high- tech manufacturing, where networks spread across the world between large 
and small companies, collaborative negotiations around contracts occur incremen-
tally. No one player is in a position to impose, and the technological and market 
conditions are highly uncertain, but cooperation is essential if the products are to 
be delivered (Dodgson 2018). This is not just ad hoc ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom 
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These ‘new commons’, frequently facilitated by easy digital connection, allow 
for a whole range of collaborative approaches to inclusive innovation and shared 
economic activity – from hacker and maker spaces to urban gardening and food 
sovereignty to community energy supply systems to urban development in ‘tran-
sition towns’ (Kirwan et al. 2016). In different ways, these create both a new form 
of community- based wealth- building, but also  – crucially  – a different route to 
addressing uncertainty through a more collective, shared approach. A key feature 
of all these initiatives – from global technology supply chains to small community 
gardens – is the movement towards an expected norm of permanent adaptability, 
as part of a process shared within a collective or network. Thus, equality and dem-
ocracy – locally and across networks – become intrinsic to addressing uncertainties 
(Rayner and Cantor 1987).
Debates about the governance of risk and uncertainty must therefore go beyond 
the rigidities of the allocation and distribution of responsibility through insurance 
liability, legal claims or regulatory fiat, and move to a more open, co- produced, 
negotiated approach, where relationships and trust are central. Some profound 
challenges are presented to discourses on trust itself. By contrast to conventional 
emphases on relations of trust flowing up power gradients (from those who are 
governed to those doing the governing), trust becomes recognisable as an intrin-
sically reciprocal and symmetrical social process (Stirling 2015). And, of course, 
the political implications here concern not just relations within structures, but the 
constituting of such structures themselves. In moving beyond cultures of control 
to ones of care and conviviality, hierarchy, inequality and appropriation are seen as 
problematic as the modes of calculation, standardisation and aggregation discussed 
earlier.
As we have already observed, this creates a momentum for a fundamental 
rethinking of existing relationships between state protection, technical expertise 
and deliberative citizenship under uncertainty. And this, in turn, requires a newly 
pluralised, inclusive politics of responsibility, where states, corporations, legal systems 
and science all have different, new roles. In moving from control to care and con-
viviality, the only meaningful ways to achieve robustness and reconciliation in the 
face of burgeoning uncertainties involve justice, equality and plurality.
Rethinking the politics of uncertainty: the challenges of 
transformation
As we have seen, uncertainties can create fear, anxiety and closure, and can be 
linked to the rise of regressive, authoritarian populisms, profit- and rent- seeking 
capital and capture by elites. But uncertainties can also generate hope, creativity, 
curiosity, entrepreneurship, discovery, innovation and epistemic humility – and so 
possibilities for emancipatory democratic transformation. Diverse questions there-
fore emerge around facilitating these progressive transformations. What methods, 
processes and mobilisations can tilt the balance towards more positive outcomes? 
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in transformatory spaces, and who is to the side? And what solidarities, ethics and 
styles of reflexivity are required for this new politics of uncertainty?
It is in relation to such questions that the balance between control and care/ 
conviviality comes to the fore. As we have suggested, open discussion of contrasts 
between risk and uncertainty can profoundly challenge the failures, fallacies and 
fictions of control. By interrogating what uncertainties are – and how we under-
stand, feel and respond to them – we can both help to destabilise, but also rebalance 
and reinvent, the institutions and practices of globalising modernity. This helps resist 
the ‘closing down’ effects of individualisation, commodification, financialisation, 
bureaucratisation, audit and securitisation. And beyond this deconstruction, this 
book attempts a reflection on the politics of uncertainty across different areas of 
political life – highlighting both possibilities and limits for the opening up of new 
forms of transformation.
Again, uncertainties can be generative of diverse, imagined alternatives. By 
opening up spaces to re- imagine futures, to dream and to construct alternatives, 
uncertainties can be confronted in positive ways: not as threats or sources of fear, 
but as sources of hope and possibility. As Rebecca Solnit (2016: xii) argues:
Hope locates itself in the premises that we don’t know what will happen and 
that in the spaciousness of uncertainty is room to act. When you recognize 
uncertainty, you recognize that you may be able to influence the outcomes – 
you alone or you in concert with a few dozen or several million others. Hope 
is an embrace of the unknown and knowable, an alternative to the certainty 
of both optimists and pessimists.
As she says, this requires a mobilisation of future- making among different actors. 
Eschewing grand visions and stylised expert scenarios, these unofficial futures 
emerge in intersecting uncertainties from the ground up, in everyday, ‘quotidian 
utopias of experience’ (Mahony and Beck 2019). In relation to climate change, 
this is perhaps already happening through the arguments of the youth climate 
strikers addressing ‘system change’ not just climate change, or the demand from 
Extinction Rebellion for ‘citizens’ assemblies’ to deliberate on alternatives (Bain and 
Bongiorno 2019). While often framed problematically in sometimes authoritarian 
and controlling terms of ‘urgent action’ and ‘impending emergency’, and with fre-
quently misplaced deference to narrow forms of expert science and singular targets 
(Asayama et al. 2019), these mobilisations can nevertheless help to open up spaces 
that demonstrate, explore and experiment with alternatives.
It is essential to bring into these conversations, the diverse implications of uncer-
tainty. One recurrent theme running through this book is that open and account-
able engagements with the politics of uncertainty are more imperative now than 
ever. For it is through such politics that the mainstream science and institutions of 
climate change must grapple with issues such as intergenerational justice and alter-
native perspectives on ‘limits’ or ‘growth’ (Kallis 2019), and so challenge the standard 
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on Climate Change and others to date (Beck and Mahony 2017). All this requires 
uncertain futures to be central to debates about climate change, environmental 
justice and sustainability.
Yet we must recognise that the socio- technical imaginaries that guide policy and 
politics are deeply resistant to change (Jasanoff and Kim 2015). Policy narratives 
routinely get stuck because they serve professional and institutional interests, and 
become convenient myths that are taken for granted (Keeley and Scoones 2003). 
Disrupting the comfortable status quo and confronting incumbent privilege and 
hegemonic power can be difficult. Mobilisations, such as those we are seeing 
around climate change, are important, but must extend across domains, as the 
chapters that follow argue. As with climate change, rethinking migration policy, city 
planning, infectious disease responses, critical infrastructure design, the regulation 
of technology, and finance and banking practice, among others, is hugely challen-
ging, given the power and authority of incumbent regimes. The argument of this 
book is that appreciations of uncertainty provide the golden thread that connects 
these issues. Given the consistent failures of mainstream modernist, technocratic 
institutions, it is vital to embed the imagining of transformative change in a vibrant 
politics of uncertainty.
This is not going to happen by itself. The lesson of the emergent, networked cli-
mate movement – as with others around food sovereignty, housing and land rights, 
energy poverty or commoning approaches – is that new solidarities are essential. 
Confronting uncertainty becomes central; not as separate and additional to resist-
ance to inequality, injustice and poverty, but as simultaneous and inseparable from 
it. This requires imagining very different futures that challenge deeply entrenched 
power and authority. In forging progressive alliances for re- imagining the future, 
the potential exclusions of both knowledges and people must be acknowledged, as 
we have discussed. Who has the luxury to create such alternatives? Whose jobs and 
livelihoods are threatened by alternative pathways? How can contingent privileges 
be harnessed to flatten encompassing gradients of power that restrict inclusion?
For many living precarious lives, uncertainties that threaten existence on a daily 
basis are created through histories of oppression and marginalisation. While the 
uncertainties of climate change may be affecting us all, the fossil fuel dependency of 
the global economy only emerged through unequal patterns of development linked 
to historical processes of exploitation. Those digging coal in hazardous working 
conditions, perhaps in the global South, are also facing uncertainties of a more 
immediate kind. The debate about uncertainty and transformations to sustainability 
therefore must create forms of solidarity and alternative pathways that appreciate 
longer histories in the politics of uncertainty.
All this involves actively supporting alternatives emerging in experimentation 
and action, especially in marginalised settings. And, in this way, these new politics of 
uncertainty chime with the long- standing politics of emancipation and decolonisa-
tion. For the resulting transformative aspirations are essentially the same: in moving 
from institutions of control to cultures of care and conviviality, familiar values come 
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economies of hope, rather than fear. And it is through embracing uncertainties in 
their many forms – and challenging the pervasive kinds of controlling apparatus 
that work to deny and obscure them – that a positive, progressive potential emerges 
at a time of crisis for democratic struggle. Now is therefore the moment for such 
pluralised, diversified, distributed and egalitarian processes of action and transform-
ation. Just as knowledges are co- produced with social orders, so may the more 
explicit embracing of uncertainties help to open up recalcitrant political structures 
and decolonise our unfolding futures.
Notes
 1 The global COVID-19 pandemic was unfolding as this book went to press. Whilst this 
chapter therefore does not address this issue directly, the discussion is nonetheless relevant 
throughout.
 2 See comments by Dipak Gyawali at The Politics of Uncertainty symposium, July 2019, www.
buff.ly/ 35D5RSI (accessed, 7 February 2020).
 3 See podcast, ‘Youth Transformations and Global Warming’, November 2019, www.
transformineducation.org/ podcasts/ youth- transformations- global- warming (accessed 7 
February 2020).
 4 In comments by Brian Wynne at The Politics of Uncertainty symposium, July 2019, and 
elaborated in subsequent very helpful personal communications.
 5 See materials from the Emancipatory Rural Politics Initiative, www.opendemocracy.net/ 
en/ authoritarian- populism- and- rural- world/ (accessed 7 February 2020).
 6 In the Democratic Republic of Congo this is referred to as ‘débrouillardise’, which is seen 
as a national trait that is vital for survival under conditions of war and economic collapse 
(Jourdan 2013).
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